Czechoslovak coalition parties' political negotiations in 1926. 4 While one cannot explain all the facets of the Gajda affair without access to Czechoslovak military and political archives (which are closed to foreign researchers), American, British, and French diplomatic reports used in conjunction with published Czechoslovak sources may clarify what happened to Gajda and his supporters, as well as the reason for the curious lack of documentation about Gajda's activities in writings by contemporary Czechoslovak historians. Indeed, the Gajda affair involved not only Czechoslovak political figures, such as President Tomas Masaryk and Foreign Minister Edvard Benes, but also foreign diplomats, including the Soviet trade representative to Czechoslovakia, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko.
Next to General Jan Syrovy (1888-1971) the hero of the battle of Zborov in July 1917, 5 Gajda was the most prominent former Russian legionary in the Czechoslovak Army. Gajda was a Pan-Slav Czech and anti-German chauvinist. He was born in 1892 at the Austrian naval base of Cattaro (Kotor). He learned Serbo-Croatian as a child and Slavicized his original German name, Rudolf Geidl, to Radola Gajda before the First World War. A man of limited education, he began the war as a druggist in the sanitary corps of the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Serbian front. After deserting to the Montenegrins in 1915, he stayed with them until the occupation of Montenegro, when he made his way to Russia. In Russia, following a series of adventures (which are described with exaggeration in his entertaining memoirs), 6 Gajda came to serve as Admiral Alexander V. Kolchak's chief of staff and later as the commander of one of the Czechoslovak armies in Siberia. Though unsophisticated and vain, Gajda possessed a natural intelligence and colorful personality that enabled him to rise rapidly in the Siberian legions. General Charles Mittelhauser, the French general who was chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff from 1921 to 1925, characterized Gajda as possessing all the advantages and disadvantages of a condottiere. Czechoslovakia. On his return home in 1920, Gajda proved especially troublesome to the Czechoslovak government and to the French military mission to Czechoslovakia, which was in charge of the army's organization and instruction. Gajda, who was twenty-eight at the time, wanted to assume a key position in the new army; but the authorities decided to remove him from Czechoslovak military affairs by sending him to France to study at the Ecole de Guerre. 6 (This course of action was not recommended for the equally prominent but more docile Jan Syrovy, who was given appointments such as the command of the Prague Military District and the post of deputy chief of staff.) After finishing his studies in France, Gajda was again refused an influential post in the army. Instead, he was given the important command of the Kosice district in eastern Slovakia, which was purposefully chosen for its distance from the army's central administration. Though Mittelhauser hoped that Gajda would keep out of trouble, Gajda agitated for a promotion and flirted with right-wing politicians, including the Slovak leader Father Andrej Hlinka and the leader of the conservative National Democratic Party and first Czechoslovak prime minister, Karel Kramaf (1860-1937).
9
In many countries, Gajda's notorious political activities and insubordination could have easily provided just cause for removal from the army. Gajda constantly tried to impress his personal views on the army high command, and on one occasion he even drew up a report on how he felt the army should be reformed and submitted it directly to President Masaryk without informing his superior, General Mittelhauser. Though Mittelhauser was justifiably infuriated at Gajda's absurd proposals (which called for the placing of many of Czechoslovakia's infantry divisions on a constant war footing), there was nothing that he could do to discipline Gajda because of the latter's influence among the Russian legionaries. 10 Czechoslovakia's legionaries, especially those who had served in Russia, were popular heroes in Czechoslovak society and politics, 11 and Gajda was one of the most important legionary leaders. None- as a nonpolitical expert to institute reforms under French guidance.
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Syrovy was appointed to the cabinet on March 19, Gajda became chief of staff on a temporary (per interim) basis until a new political cabinet could be formed. Gajda's temporary promotion aroused fears among center and left-wing politicians that he might use his position to further political ambitions. In early March, the Social Democratic paper, Prdvo lidu, stated that, on trips to Brno in connection with his duties as a member of the governing board of Zbrojovka (the Czechoslovak Armament Works), Gajda helped organize a chapter of the Nezavisla jednota legiondfu with the assent of Syrovy. 20 In
April he visited Slovakia to inspect army units, and an officer confidant of the German consul in Bratislava told the consul that Gajda was holding closed meetings of legionaries in order to ascertain the extent of his legionary support and to give new impetus to his following. The officer asserted that Gajda was interested in strengthening the right wing in Czechoslovak politics but not in carrying out an actual coup.
21
Despite these activities, Gajda might have ridden out his appointment without serious incident had it not been for the Pilsudski coup in Poland, which was carried out in the aftermath of the fall of the Skrzynski government on May 5. Gajda had been attacked in the Czechoslovak parliament as early as April 22, when a Czech senator denounced him, 22 but the Pilsudski coup provoked a strong reaction in Czechoslovakia, crystallizing sentiment for and against Gajda. In early 1926, Czechoslovak politics had been tumultuous not only because of the instability of the government coalition but also because of incidents between right-wing Czechs and Germans. The anti-Semitic Narodni hnuti favored by Kramaf was a particular source of unrest. 23 Czechoslovak press. 25 The forthcoming Sokol congress (a gala display of Czech gymnastics held every six years), scheduled for July 4-6, provided the incentive for further rumor that Gajda might use the Sokol organization, which was known for its nationalism, to venture a "march on Rome." Czech Fascists openly touted the slogan: "Co Cech, to Sokol, co Sokol, to fasista" ("Every Czech is a Sokol, every Sokol is a Fascist").
26
Although the attacks on Gajda intensified, Gajda himself remained outwardly passive. As an officer, he was forbidden to defend himself publicly, and the Ministry of National Defense released a statement denying that Gajda was involved in any wrongdoing. 27 Nonetheless, both left-and right-wing papers continued to speculate about Gajda, and sharp debates about him raged in the Parliament. Masaryk, Benes, Klofac, and the Social Democratic Party leaders worked assiduously for Gajda's ouster. In 1943, Benes recalled that Masaryk even tried to buy off Gajda by sending him money. Gajda supposedly pocketed the money but did not retire as Masaryk had suggested. 28 Finally, on July 2, Masaryk removed Gajda from his post, sent him on leave, and had him investigated for possible misconduct.
29
Gajda's removal from the army did not end the "Gajda affair" for several months. In mid-July, the British military attache observed that the controversy surrounding Gajda was mounting so quickly that Gajda would have to act immediately if he were conspiring against the civilian government, but Gajda apparently did little. 30 An announcement, immediately following his ouster, that Gajda had given a Soviet intelligence agent "secret" French documents while a student at the Ecole de Guerre 31 aggravated the situation.
Gajda himself began to speak out against his detractors in public, and the debate about him raged on. In early September, in an interview with the liberal German By the fall of 1926, Gajda, despite the attention focused on him, no longer possessed a power base within the army (Benes later admitted that he had great difficulty convincing Czechoslovak army officers of Gajda's misconduct). 34 The alleged threat of a coup had passed. Gajda's loss of power was illustrated by the appointment of General Alois Podhajsky to replace him as acting chief of staff. Podhajsky, a former Austro-Hungarian officer, served in the post from September 1 until mid-October, when Syrovy h could return to his post after the formation of a new cabinet under Svehla. Syrovy disliked Podhajsky, who was popular among former Austro-Hungarian officers within the army, but Podhajsky was one of the most capable officers available to take over the chief of staff's duties.
Despite sympathy for Gajda among the Russian legionaries, Benes was able to press his case against Gajda, and no high-ranking legionaries openly championed Gajda's cause. In December, a military tribunal convicted Gajda of having had contact with the Soviet government in 1920; he was given the surprisingly light sentence of retirement from the army and the loss of 25 percent of his pension.
Undoubtedly the Gajda affair, which was to drag on until 1928, possessed numerous facets not apparent at first glance. One might imagine, from the initial accusation regarding the French "secret" documents, that Gajda had been removed through the urgings of the French legation or of General Faucher because of Gajda's alleged misconduct in France. However, the records of the French Foreign Ministry show that the French were as mystified as anyone else by the progress of the Gajda affair. General Faucher reported to Paris that Gajda could not have had access to any "secret" documents in France, as students were obviously never given any privileged information. 35 Gajda was eventually accused of having given the Soviet agent that Gajda had indeed been in touch with the Soviets in 1920. 37 As Gajda was virulently anti-Communist and pro-Fascist, the Soviets understandably disliked him, but the Soviet role in the affair appeared enigmatic to American, British, and French diplomats. The French speculated that Benes and Antonov-Ovseenko may have instigated the proceedings against Gajda, and highlevel Soviet interest in the affair was demonstrated by an attack on Gajda in Pravda on January 11, 1927. 38 The Communists also joined the Socialists in attacking Gajda in the press and in parliament. 39 While it is not known whether Antonov-Ovseenko provided Benes with evidence against Gajda, Gajda's alleged contacts with the Soviet government undoubtedly explain why the Gajda affair has never been thoroughly discussed in the writings of contemporary Czechoslovak scholars. The Communist effort to discredit Gajda may be understood in relation to the attitude of the Soviet government in 1926, for the Soviets were seeking the diplomatic recognition of Czechoslovakia and were attempting to weaken anti-Soviet groups in Czechoslovak political life.
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The attempt of Masaryk and Benes to discredit Gajda encountered difficulties in 1927 when Gajda used a civil court .to sue the two main witnesses against him for libel. The charges against Gajda were not supported by documentary evidence but by the personal testimony of an old foe, Major Jaroslav Kratochvil (a Social Democrat and former Russian legionary who had opposed the Allied intervention in Siberia), 41 and two other witnesses of dubious personal integrity, who held personal grudges against Gajda. Much to the embarrassment of the Hrad, the civil court upheld Gajda's suit in a decision announced in March 1927. 42 There was no longer any danger that Gajda might recover his military post, but he threatened to become a powerful ally of right-wing forces in Czechoslovak politics. This setback did not deter the Hrad from producing further evidence to discredit Gajda and to bring him to trial a second time, as was permitted under Czechoslovak law. To invite Gajda in our name to come here is inopportune. Nevertheless, if he writes us and asks to come here we cannot object; the authorization is assured in advance. It would be interesting to know beforehand what offers he will make us; we have nothing to offer him and we await what he will say to us. Arrange it so that the initiative comes from him and not from us. 43 Did these telegrams prove Gajda's contacts with the Soviet government? President Masaryk described the curious background of the Czechoslovak possession of the telegrams to the British minister to Prague, Sir George Clerk. Under the agreement establishing the Soviet Trade Delegation in Prague, all telegrams sent from Moscow to the Trade Delegation were sent directly to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry. In 1920, the Czechoslovak government lacked the facilities to decode the telegrams, and they were only decoded after being sent to Switzerland in 1921. According to Masaryk, when the telegrams were decoded, several were found to mention Gajda. 44 The question then arises, if Gajda had been implicated in contacts with the Soviet government when the telegrams were decoded, why did the Czechoslovak government take no action against him in 1921 ? Masaryk told Sir George Clerk that the Czechoslovak government did not want to reveal that the telegrams had been deciphered. Masaryk thus justified Benes's having waited five years before going to the minister of national defense with the information. 45 that the telegrams probably could not be used in a Czechoslovak court against Gajda because they involved third parties. 46 Indeed, the telegrams were never produced as evidence in a civil court. Masaryk told Sir George Clerk that he was personally convinced of Gajda's guilt, but he complained that Soviet officials refused to give evidence against Gajda in court. 47 Soviet officials, however, could hardly have become involved in a Czechoslovak court case against Gajda regarding intelligence matters.
Gajda was tried anew in a special military court of appeals and, in February 1928, he was found guilty of six charges: (1) negotiating with the Soviet government at a time when the Czechoslovak government was on unfriendly terms with Moscow, (2) giving two books of information from the Ecole de Guerre to a Russian intelligence agent while a student in France, (3) publicly criticizing his leave of absence, (4) cooperating with the Fascist movement in Prague, (5) plotting the overthrow of the Czechoslovak government with General Josef Snejdarek, 48 and (6) giving out false statements about his military training and service to newspapers in order to influence public opinion. 49 In spite of the seriousness of these charges, Gajda's punishment was only a reaffirmation of his retirement from the army and the loss of one-quarter of his pension. A careful examination of the charges may reveal why Gajda was not punished more severely. At first glance, the evidence supporting the charges seems substantial. There can be no doubt that Gajda's political activities provided ample cause for his removal from the army. Moreover, he cooperated with Fascist groups and publicly criticized his leave of absence. However, it is noteworthy that Gajda, who had meddled in politics since 1920, had never previously been disciplined for his political activities. The three charges relating to conduct unbecoming to an officer (3, 4, and 6) were supplemented by three additional charges which were used to discredit Gajda in the eyes of the Czechoslovak public. The military court of appeals was composed of two hand-picked legionaries and one former Austro-Hungarian officer who undoubtedly were willing to go along with the views of government officials eager to discredit Gajda. 50 Gajda had won a civil suit against the two witnesses who charged him with having stolen two books of information from the Ecole de Guerre, but the military court, which was not open to the public and which was governed by rules of evidence different from those of a civil court, upheld the witnesses' testimony. Although popular speculation had focused on Gajda's alleged plan for a coup, the only charge relating to a military conspiracy was that he had advocated the overthrow of the government to General Snejdarek. Gajda and Snejdarek were not on close terms, and there is no clear indication of why Gajda would have chosen Snejdarek as a confidant. Gajda claimed that the meeting with Snejdarek, at which the "plotting" was discussed, was arranged by Benes. Benes, of course, denied Gajda's assertion. 61 The Czech historian Alena Gajanova accepts Benes's version of the incident, but, in view of Benes's boasting in 1943 (Benes claimed principal credit for discrediting Gajda and for covering up Masaryk's attempted bribe 52 ) about his role in the removal of Gajda, further evidence would be necessary to demonstrate the veracity of either Benes or Gajda. In 1928, Benes also accused Gajda of cooperating with former Minister of National Defense Stfibrny, 53 but this accusation was politically motivated and casts further doubt on the veracity of Benes's public statements. Stfibrny was never arrested with Gajda, and if, in 1926, either Benes or Masaryk, or Faucher, had had any suspicion that Gajda and Stfibrny were plotting, Gajda would certainly not have been given temporary control of the General Staff.
Only two historians have attempted to document Gajda's alleged military conspiracy. The first of these is Juraj Kramer, who has described contacts between Gajda and Slovak dissidents led by Vojtech Tuka. In Iredenta a separatismus v slovenskej politike {Iredenta and Separatism in Slovak Politics), Kramer cites Hungarian diplomatic reports stating that Gajda met three times with Tuka in the first half of 1926, and that Gajda, on June 27, came to an agreement with Tuka to carry out a Putsch before the presidential elections of 1927. 64 Kramer's evidence, however, does not justify the conclusion that Gajda was plotting a coup during the Sokol festival in 1926. If we ignore the possibility that the information in the diplomatic reports was only partially accurate, we would still be forced to conclude that Gajda's agreements with Tuka were rather tentative. Moreover, Tuka's own political Revolutionary feeling flared up again in 1926. There were wild rumors: "Leftist parties prepare a coup," "Czech Fascists prepare a coup." I explored both eventualities. I negotiated with the Czech Fascists about common action, of course, on condition that Slovakia would be granted autonomy by the new regime. I negotiated also with the Communists about the possibility of common action. It did not matter to me with whom I worked.
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In 1926, although both left-and right-wing movements in Czechoslovakia were extremely vocal, the more extreme Fascist groups were relatively weak, representing a threat to the power of Masaryk more through their connections with important politicians like Kramaf and Stfibrny than through their own intrinsic strength.
Gajda's alleged plotting has also been described by Vaclav Pesa. In an article appearing in 1953, Pesa quotes an informant who indicated that the Fascists and Gajda wanted to carry out a coup in October 1926. 67 The informant's information is found in the Brno archives, but, considering the rampant rumors in 1926, it cannot be taken seriously without additional evidence. Gajda was, of course, partially responsible for inciting the Fascist hopes, but accusing him of plotting a military coup would be too harsh a judgment in the light of available evidence. Furthermore, it is surprising that so little evidence concerning "coup plotting" was uncovered, in view of the fact that Gajda had many personal enemies among former AustroHungarian officers and even among the legionaries. Even though contemporaries felt that Gajda's friendship with Syrovy and certain other legionaries prevented a stronger sentence, 58 the lack of evidence against him was certainly a factor in his lenient treatment. 69 The government clearly did not want to create a martyr for the Fascists. After his conviction, Gajda remained active in Czechoslovak politics, though he was unable to build a strong power base. He was elected a deputy to Parliament in 1929 and remained active in the NOF. Following his election, Gajda became involved in several other political scandals. In 1931, he was implicated in a political intrigue, stripped of his parliamentary immunity, and forced to give up his pension. In 1934, several Gajda supporters, including his nephew Duchoslav Geidl, were arrested during a raid on the barracks of the Forty-third Infantry Regiment in Brno. Gajda was found guilty of having had prior knowledge of the raid, though it could not be proved that he was directly involved.
60 Thereafter Gajda remained a vocal but relatively powerless critic of the Czechoslovak regime.
While Gajda never achieved success in carrying out his political ambitions, his activities prompted many moderate Czech politicians to try to remove the army from politics. In the fall of 1926, the Cerny cabinet sponsored a bill eliminating the voting franchise from the officer corps and gendarmerie. In the early 1920s, voting in the army had been permitted as a concession to socialism and populism, but voting encouraged officers to become involved in politics. The Russian legionaries, in particular, became a vocal political group, which was represented in Parliament by several legionary deputies holding specially-reserved mandates. Many Czech political figures like Cerny and Svehla were happy to correct former abuses by sponsoring a new franchise bill which eventually became Law number 56 of April 8, 1927.
61 Most legionaries opposed the bill, while former Austro-Hungarian officers, who were generally more apolitical, supported it with enthusiasm. 62 Even the semiofficial Central European Observer admitted that the results of the law were beneficial to discipline in the barracks, which had previously been racked by political disputes during election campaigns.
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A second blow to legionary power followed in late 1926 and 1927, when Prime Minister Svehla and his fellow-Agrarian Udrzal arranged for the appointment of Podhajsky, Gajda's successor as acting chief of staff, to the post of inspector-general of the army. The latter post had been vacant since 1924, when the previous inspector-general, the poet Josef Svatopluk Machar, had been forced to retire in a scandal. Supporters of the former AustroHungarian officers were eager to have Podhajsky appointed to lessen the legionary influence in the army, but Masaryk resented Czech officers who had remained loyal to the Habsburgs. He told Udrzal that he would not 60 countersign Udrzal's administrative order appointing Podhajsky as was required by the Constitution. When Masaryk went on a trip to the Near East in 1927, however, Udrzal signed the order and put Masaryk in the embarrassing position of being unable to block the appointment. On his return, Masaryk had to assent to the signing of the order to avoid losing face. 64 The appointment of Podhajsky, one of the most able officers in the army, added an additional element of stability to the officer corps. Acting as a counterweight to the power of the legionaries, his appointment decreased the possibility of a second "Gajda affair."
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The Gajda affair thus had complex consequences affecting many areas of Czechoslovak military and civilian life. The affair demonstrated that, although the civilian government could be shaken by political crises, civilians were still firmly in control. As far as the army was concerned, the removal of Gajda put an end to the worst abuses of the legionary movement. The appointment of Podhajsky as acting chief of staff and, in 1927, as inspectorgeneral showed that, in the final analysis, many Czechoslovak politicians preferred experienced Austro-Hungarian officers to unreliable officers like Gajda, whose activities had threatened the political neutrality of the army. Czechoslovakia was fortunate, nonetheless, for most prominent legionaries, like Syrovy, lacked strong political ambitions and were content to let the French military mission guide the army's development. Fascism never became a dominant force among the legionaries. The French military mission, while benefiting from Gajda's removal, was a spectator in the events of 1926 and 1927. General Faucher told the British military attache in 1926 that the French military mission found the whole matter "tiresome." The British military attache commented: "The whole situation would be inconceivable in one of the more civilized western armies. For myself, I do not pretend to understand it." 66 Although several historians have claimed that Radola Gajda intended to carry out a coup in 1926, the Gajda affair should be interpreted as a factional dispute accompanying the intrigues of Czechoslovak political parties in 1926 rather than as a full-fledged conspiracy to overthrow the government by military force. Fascist agitation in Czechoslovakia coupled with the Pilsudski coup in Poland induced many Czechs and Germans to fear that Gajda represented a serious threat to civilian government, but Gajda never had a role within the Czechoslovak Army as powerful as that of Pilsudski in Poland.
When Gajda was removed in July 1926, he had not consolidated his power to a point where he could have used force-if indeed he contemplated the use of force. Benes and Masaryk produced a wide range of accusations against Gajda, linking him both with the Soviet Union and with the Fascists in order to destroy his ties to Kramaf and Stfibrny. Though victorious in their endeavors, Masaryk and Benes employed tactics similar to those of their op-' ponents; and Benes's own admission-if true-that Masaryk tried to bribe Gajda demonstrates how the political debate of 1926 was conducted. The issue of Gajda's inadequate abilities as a military officer was lost in the melee of accusations and counteraccusations.
As a result of the political infighting, the Hrad emerged victorious over Kramaf and Stfibrny and their tacit legionary ally, Gajda.
87 Kramaf, however, soon realized that Gajda was thoroughly discredited. He abandoned Gajda and reached a modus vivendi with Masaryk and Benes. 68 Stfibrny, on the other hand, continued his association with Gajda, and emerged from the affair with weakened public support. By keeping Benes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Masaryk ensured the continuity of his personal influence in the government, and also maintained Benes's influence in foreign affairs. A few aspects of the Gajda affair, in particular the issue of Gajda's alleged contacts with the Soviet government, may remain enigmatic for some time to come, but it is clear that Gajda's fall contributed to the stability of Czechoslovak political life by affirming Masaryk's power. 
